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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY
Warren L. Mengis*
In a recent case involving a conflict of interests, Judge Charles
A. Marvin stated,. "The Code of Professional Responsibility, since
Watergate, is a required course in the nation's law schools. Members
of the profession have the duty to maintain competency in all areas
of the law, including this area, for the good of the client and of the
profession."' Since Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Products,' there has been
little doubt as to the importance of the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility. As the court said in that opinion:
The Code of Professional Responsibility which regulates attorneys'
practices has been recognized as having the force and effect of
substantive law. As a result, these rules set forth by virtue of
the Court's exercise of its prevailing judicial authority override
legislative acts which tend to impede or frustrate that authority;
only legislative enactments in this area which aid the court's in-
herent powers will be approved.'
Even with such emphasis, the system of justice and lawyers in general
are held in low esteem. The finding that John W. Hinckley, Jr. was
not guilty by reason of insanity in the attempted murder of Presi-
dent Reagan did not help matters at all. As pointed out by Richard
F. Knight, who reviewed the work of the courts during the 1980-1981
term,' the Supreme Court of Louisiana continues to seek that delicate
balance needed to protect the public from the actions of irresponsible
or careless attorneys while, at the same time, not unduly penalizing
or punishing an attorney who has demonstrated an understanding of
his prior wrongdoing and has taken those measures that convince the
court that his future conduct will be consistent with the high stan-
dards of his profession.
DISCIPLINE
Only three full-scale disciplinary proceedings were reported dur-
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ing this term. In Louisiana State Bar Association v. Levy,5 the respon-
dent attorney was convicted by a jury in a federal district court of
five counts of violating and conspiring to violate the Travel Act, 18
U.S.C. S 1952, and was sentenced to serve concurrently two years
on each conviction. In due course and in accordance with article 15,
section 8 of the Articles of Incorporation of the Louisiana State Bar
Association, proceedings were instituted by the Committee on Pro-
fessional Responsibility to suspend or disbar Mr. Levy. The court
found that a serious crime had been committed, justifying a substan-
tial punishment to avoid deprecation of the offense and to provide
a meaningful deterrent tb other potential offenders. A suspension of
18 months was ordered after the court considered mitigating cir-
cumstances. The court stated, "The purpose of lawyer discipline pro-
ceedings is to maintain appropriate standards of professional conduct
in order to protect the public and the administration of justice from
lawyers who have demonstrated in their conduct that they are unable
or likely to be unable to discharge their professional duties."6
Following the same precept is Louisiana State Bar Association
v. Heymann.7 In this case, the attorney had been convicted of transport-
ing falsely made and counterfeit securities.' The commissioner, in his
report to the supreme court, concluded that the respondent suffered
from a psychological or emotional disorder consisting of a compulsive
or addictive gambling habit or disease, but, since the offense, he had
made a determined effort to overcome the problem. The court con-
cluded that the respondent attorney had been convicted of two felonies
involving deceit and dishonesty and that his criminal conduct violated
the Code of Professional Responsibility. A two-year suspension was
therefore deemed appropriate, even though the respondent seemed
a good candidate for rehabilitation.
The last of the three disciplinary proceedings was Louisiana State
Bar Association v. O'Halloran.' In this case, the respondent attorney
was convicted of evading taxes in two successive years and of willful-
ly filing a false return for the third year. Disciplinary proceedings
were instituted under the provisions of article 15, section 8 of the
Articles of Incorporation of the Louisiana State Bar Association, and
the respondent attorney was suspended for a period of three years
by the supreme court. The court stated that a lawyer owes a profes-
sional duty to refrain from illegal conduct involving moral turpitude,
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or con-
5. 400 So. 2d 1355 (La. 1981).
6. 400 So. 2d at 1358.
7. 405 So. 2d 826 (La. 1981).
8. The attorney's conduct violated 18 U.S.C. S 2314 (1976).
9. 412 So. 2d 523 (La. 1982).
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duct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. If there is
any doubt in the minds of attorneys that income tax evasion or filing
false returns is a crime involving "moral turpitude," this case should
remove it."
These three disciplinary proceedings represent only a part of the
overall problem of attorney misconduct. Another attorney was dis-
barred by consent" and two others were suspended under the provisions
of article 15 section 8(4).2 In a rather curious order, a third suspen-
sion under article 15 section 8(4) was declined and the matter was
referred back to the committee for further proceedings in Louisiana
Bar Association v. Dozier.'3
In addition to these matters, the court considered the applications
for reinstatement of seven attorneys who previously had been dis-
barred. Three applications were denied,'" one was referred back to the
Committee on Professional Responsibility of the Louisiana State Bar
Association,'5 and three were granted.
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
There were several very interesting cases involving those con-
flicts of interest which confront the practicing attorney. In Boyette
v. Auger Timber Co.,'7 a conflict resulted from the filing of a third
party petition by the three defendants against one of the plaintiffs.
The suit arose out of a collision between a tractor-trailer rig and an
automobile. The driver of the automobile, a guest passenger, and the
mother of a deceased guest passenger joined in filing suit against the
owner of the tractor-trailer rig, its liability insurer, the driver of the
rig, and the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Develop-
ment. All of the defendants then filed a third party demand against
the driver of the automobile - Mr. Harvey Lowe - and his insurer, seek-
ing contribution in the event that the defendants were cast in judg-
ment. The attorney for Mr. Lowe's insurer, however, took the posi-
tion before the jury that Lowe had been negligent in the operation
of his vehicle and that his negligence was the sole cause of the acci-
10. See also L.S.B.A. v. Ponder, 340 So. 2d 134 (La. 1976).
11. L.S.B.A. v. Johnson, 412 So. 2d 1087 (La. 1982).
12. L.S.B.A. v. Marcal, 400 So. 2d 897 (La. 1981); L.S.B.A. v. Shapiro, 412 So. 2d
990 (La. 1982).
13. 404 So. 2d 1258 (La. 1981).
14. L.S.B.A. v. Stoker, 407 So. 2d 723 (La. 1981); L.S.B.A. v. Schmitt, 413 So. 2d
499 (La. 1982); L.S.B.A. v. Russell, 414 So. 2d 1250 (La. 1982).
15. L.S.B.A. v. Philips, 409 So. 2d 676 (La. 1982).
16. L.S.B.A. v. Loridans, 412 So. 2d 1102 (La. 1982); In re Hennigan, 412 So. 2d
1102 (La. 1982); In re Shaheen, 414 So. 2d 782 (La. 1982).
17. 403 So. 2d 800 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
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dent. This position obviously would have benefited Continental In-
surance, the insurer of Mr. Lowe, because if true, the main demand
would have fallen as to all defendants, which necessarily would have
terminated the third party demand against Continental and Lowe. One
can imagine the confusion of the jury as Mr. Lowe's original attorney
argued that he was free from negligence and Mr. Lowe's other at-
torney, representing his liability insurer, argued that he was negligent.
On the second day of trial, Mr. Lowe's original attorney moved for
a mistrial, arguing surprise at the position taken by Continental's
counsel, which he felt was prejudicial to his client. The trial court
denied the motion, commenting that each attorney would represent
Lowe to the best of his ability according to his position in the case.
The jury found no negligence on the part of the defendants other
than the Department of Transportation, and the trial judge found no
negligence on the part of that defendant. The suit was dismissed and
the plaintiffs appealed. The majority opinion of the court of appeal
found that the position taken by Continental's counsel was highly pre-
judicial to the plaintiff and that the trial should not have been allow-
ed to proceed. However, after a review of the entire record, the court
concluded that the decision according to the law was correct and it
affirmed. In his concurring opinion, Judge Marvin highlighted this ex-
traordinary conflict of interest. In the first place, the driver of the
automobile and the guest passengers should not have been represented
by the same attorney, particularly when a third party action later
asserted the negligence of that driver as the cause of the accident.18
In addition, Judge Marvin especially concurred in the statement of
the majority that the trial of the case should not have been allowed
to proceed when Continental's attorney, who was also Mr. Lowe's at-
torney, took a position contrary to Mr. Lowe's own interest. Judge
Marvin's concurring opinion and the citations contained therein should
be carefully studied by all trial lawyers.
In State v. Franklin,9 a conviction and sentence were reversed
because the defendant's attorney had a serious conflict of interest at
the time of the trial. The East Baton Rouge Parish Public Defender's
Office was appointed to represent both the defendant in this case and
his sister, who was charged on a separate bill of information with
a separate offense. It was not until the day before the trial that the
public defender and the court learned that the offenses arose out of
the same transaction and that the two defendants were related. The
sister pleaded guilty and was to be granted immunity from armed
18. See L.S.B.A. Comm. on Professional Responsibility, Op. 102 (appeared in the
Lawyers Desk Book, at 0-3, prior to the removal of older opinions when the new Code
of Professional Responsibility was adopted).
19. 400 So. 2d 616 (La. 1981).
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robbery or other related offenses if she agreed to testify against her
brother. On the morning of the trial and prior to the swearing in of
any of the witnesses, the public defender moved to withdraw in both
cases because of his prior representation of both brother and sister.
The trial judge recognized the conflict and relieved the public defender
from representing the sister, but refused to relieve him from represent-
ing the brother. The court held that the mere possibility of a con-
flict is insufficient to reverse a criminal conviction. However, if a defen-
dant establishes that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected
his lawyer's performance, he has demonstrated a violation of his sixth
amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his rights
under article I, section 13 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. If
an actual conflict exists, there is no need for a defendant to prove
that he was also prejudiced thereby. Showing of an actual conflict
mandates reversal, and the court found in this case that there was,
in fact, an actual conflict.
In Teel v. Teel," the husband filed a motion to recuse his wife's
attorney because that attorney had represented the husband both per-
sonally and through his corporation over a period of eight years and
had gained intimate knowledge of all of the husband's affairs. Since
the wife was seeking to obtain a partition of the community proper-
ty, an inventory of the community property, and an injunction against
the husband to prevent him from disposing of or alienating any com-
munity property, the husband contended that the prior relationship
and the confidentiality required in connection therewith would be
violated by the present representation of the wife by the same at-
torney. The trial judge required the withdrawal of the wife's attorney,
and application was made for supervisory writs. The appellate court
concluded that the order of withdrawal was correct, citing Canon 4
that "a lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client"
and Canon 5 that "a lawyer should exercise independent professional
judgment on behalf of a client."'" Although conflicts are sometimes
difficult to perceive, the court in this case noted that a conflict was
apparent.
In a somewhat similar case, Rollo v. Dison,"2 the trial judge was
recused in a civil suit because he had previously served in the capaci-
ty of a first assistant district attorney in criminal matters arising out
of the same circumstances that gave rise to the civil suit. The court
noted that article 151(2) of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure man-
20. 400 So. 2d 357 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
21. LA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canons 4 & 5 (found in ARTICLES OF
INCORPORATION, LOUISIANA STATE BAR ASS'N art. XVI; LA. R.S. 37 Ch. 4 app.) [hereinafter
cited as CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY].
22. 402 So. 2d 122 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
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dated recusal in such a situation, even though the judge's personal
contact with the criminal proceedings had been minimal while he was
an assistant district attorney.
ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION
There was only one decision by the supreme court in the adver-
tising and solicitation area: In re Fabacher.3 Mr. Fabacher sought to
restrain the Louisiana State Bar Association from enforcing
Disciplinary Rule 2-105. Apparently, Mr. Fabacher took issue with this
disciplinary rule and with the committee's practice of forbidding an
attorney from advertising that he practiced in a specific area of the
law. The court denied the application "since under today's adoption
by this court of the Committee on Professional Responsibility's pro-
posed amendments to Disciplinary Rules 2-101(D) and 2-105, relator
may advertise that he practices in a specific area of the law." It should
be noted that the code still provides that a lawyer shall not state
or imply that he is a specialist, except that a lawyer admitted to prac-
tice before the United States Patent Office may use the designation
"Patent Attorney" or a substantially similar designation. The code
goes on to provide that the lawyer recognized as a specialist under
a plan approved by the Louisiana State Bar Association may indicate
that speciality, but no such plan has been put into effect by the bar
association as of this date.u It also should be noted that the code pro-
vides that a lawyer's specification that his practice "is limited to" or
"concentrated in" particular fields implies formal recognition as a
specialist and is likewise not permitted. This change in the Louisiana
Code of Professional Responsibility makes it unnecessary to consider
the effect of the United States Supreme Court decision, In re R.M.J.,25
decided on January 25, 1982.
MALPRACTICE
The question of whether a malpractice action is in tort or con-
tract was raised again in Cummings v. Skeahan Corp.," wherein the
plaintiff sought recovery of damages against his attorney for failing
to discover a mineral lease and include it in his title opinion. The
defendant attorney filed an exception of prescription of one year, rely-
ing on the jurisprudence pertaining to medical malpractice. A majori-
ty of the court held that a malpractice action against an attorney par-
takes of elements both ex contractu and ex delicto and, since the plain-
tiff in this case had clearly alleged a breach of contract, the prescrip-
23. 409 So. 2d 635 (La. 1981).
24. See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-105(A)(1) & (2).
25. 102 S. Ct. 929 (1982).
26. 405 So. 2d 1146 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
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tion applicable was ten years; the holding of the trial court sustain-
ing the prescription of one year was reversed. In a concurring opin-
ion, Judge Edwards pointed out the conflict existing in the First
Circuit Court of Appeal's prior decisions of Jackson v. Zito27 and Vessel
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.2" In the former decision, no
distinction was made between different types of malpractice actions
and it was set forth that the action could be maintained in contract
as well as tort. However, in Vessel, where there was no dispute as
to the client-attorney relationship, as the issue was solely one of
whether the attorney failed to meet the standard of professional ex-
pertise, the action lay in tort only.
In two cases, the court found no contract existing between the
plaintiff and the attorney sued. In Deville v. Zaunbrecher,' the plain-
tiff filed suit against an attorney who had handled a case against him
for a client. More than one year had passed, and the court held that
while it was questionable that the plaintiff had stated a cause of ac-
tion in his petition, in any event it would be classified as an offense
or quasi-offense arising under article 2315 of the Civil Code and was,
therefore prescribed.
In Bill Nolan Livestock, Inc. v. Simpson,3 the attorney against
whom suit was filed had been appointed by the court to represent
a nonresident defendant. The plaintiff contended that his court-
appointed attorney had committed malpractice by breaching his pro-
fessional and contractual duties in allegedly failing to take any steps
to contact Nolan Livestock and inform it of potential defenses. An
exception of prescription of one year was filed by the defendant at-
torney; this exception was sustained in the lower court and affirmed
in the court of appeal. The court found that this was not the usual
situation in which the attorney and client come together voluntarily
and there is a meeting of the minds as to the purpose of the relation-
ship. Instead, this relationship was based upon the court's order that
the attorney represent the nonresident client. This being true, there
was no contractual relationship to justify a ten-year prescriptive
period.
In Nelson v. Appalachian Insurance Co. of Providence," the plain-
tiff brought suit directly against his attorney's malpractice insurer,
contending that he had been injured by his attorney's failure to perfect
an appeal. The court reiterated the rule that in order to prevail in
27. 314 So. 2d 401 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
28. 276 So. 2d 874 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
29. 401 So. 2d 643 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
30. 402 So. 2d 214 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
31. 399 So. 2d 711 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
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a legal malpractice suit involving alleged mishandling of a suit, a plain-
tiff must show that because the prior suit was mishandled, the plain-
tiff lost the original suit or had his position otherwise impaired. The
court then considered the alleged mishandling and found that the deci-
sion of the trial court was, in fact, correct and that an appeal would
not have helped the plaintiff. Accordingly, the court affirmed the
dismissal of the plaintiffs suit.
In Fontenot v. Memphis Farms, Inc.,32 the attorney was brought
into the litigation by a third party demand of the defendant lessor,
who contended that if he had breached the lease with Fontenot, who
had originally brought suit for damages, such breach was due to the
fault of the third party defendant attorney. Essentially, the third party
demand against the attorney was based on alleged oral representa-
tions by the attorney that financing would be no problem. However,
the evidence showed that the attorney never guaranteed that the loan
would be approved nor did he give any opinion on the likelihood of
its approval. In addition, it appeared that the third party plaintiff
acknowledged in his deposition that at no time was the attorney
representing him and at no time was he ever under the impression
that the attorney had been representing him. In view of this uncon-
tradicted testimony, the summary judgment granted below was af-
firmed, insofar as the third party defendant attorney was concerned.
Finally, comes the decision of Viccinelli v. Causey.3 3 This case ac-
tually got to the merits of conduct which had fallen below acceptable
professional standards. Defendant attorney represented Mrs.
Simoneaux in separation and divorce proceedings and, finally, in the
community property settlement which gave rise to this malpractice
action. In the partition agreement, Mrs. Simoneaux was to receive the
family home and assume payment of the first mortgage thereon. Mr.
Simoneaux assumed all other community debts. At the time of the
community partition, a judgment in the amount of $2,495 was of record
against Mr. Simoneaux. Defendant attorney admitted under cross-
examination that he was aware of the judgment, which effected a
judicial mortgage against the property being conveyed to his client,
but he did not advise her of the effect of it, although he testified
that he did discuss it with her. All of this took place in 1971. Mrs.
Simoneaux testified that she first learned of the judgment in 1977
when she sold her home and was forced to pay off a total amount
of $4,452, which was the amount demanded in the suit against Mr.
Simoneaux and Mr. Causey. The court found, after a complete review
of the evidence, that Mr. Causey's representation of his client fell
32. 411 So. 2d 1257 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
33. 401 So. 2d 1243 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
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below any reasonable standard of care, diligence, and skill and that
he was guilty of professional malpractice. Accordingly, the judgment
of the trial court against him was affirmed. In concurring, Judge Cole
pointed out that the attorney noticeably never conveyed to his client
knowledge elementary to even the most unskilled counsel; that is, a
money judgment creates a judicial mortgage against the judgment
debtor's immovable property. "This failure to fulfill his duty and
responsibility as an attorney, whether the result of negligence or by
design, cost his client [$4,452] and is the very essence of malpractice."'
FEES AND MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS
The Code of Professional Responsibility makes it quite clear that
attorneys are entitled to and should charge a reasonable fee;" however,
almost every attorney from the young to the old will have difficulty
from time to time in determining what is a reasonable fee under the
circumstances. The factors set forth in Disciplinary Rule 2-106(B) are
of course helpful, and many attorneys are now using a written con-
tract arrangement so that there will be no misunderstanding in regard
to the fee being charged. Attorneys who work on an hourly basis are
training themselves to keep meticulous time records; even so, disputes
arise, and the past term was no exception.
In Coon v. Landry," the attorney and her clients entered into a
written "retainer agreement" which fixed the plaintiffs fee on a con-
tingency basis. In addition, the agreement stated that the clients
agreed to pay all costs and expenses necessary to prosecute the claim
to a proper conclusion. A judgment was duly obtained against one
James A. Knight, but it was apparently uncollectable as Mr. Knight
had left the state. The attorney subsequently made claim against her
clients for out of pocket expenses amounting to $482, which her clients
refused to pay; whereupon, this suit followed. Later, the attorney
amended her petition to seek $1,000 as reasonable attorney's fees for
services rendered on a quantum meruit basis. The defendants in this
suit contended that neither the fee nor the expenses were owed
because nothing had been collected on the judgment and, consequent-
ly, the case had not been brought to a "proper conclusion." The at-
torney argued that Disciplinary Rule 5-103 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that clients remain ultimately liable
for expenses of litigation, including court costs, expenses of investiga-
tion, expenses of medical examination, and costs of obtaining and
presenting evidence, made it clear that the clients owed for these
34. 401 So. 2d at 1245.
35. See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 2-16, EC 2-17, EC 2-18, DR 2-106.
36. 400 So. 2d 1144 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
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expenses, regardless of any collection on the judgment. The court held
that although the ethical considerations in the disciplinary rules of
the Louisiana State Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility
are intended to govern the conduct and practice of law by attorneys,
they are not binding on clients and, consequently, the law between
the parties in this case was the retainer agreement. It then found
that the language in the contract was vague and that the words to
bring "a case to a proper conclusion" were too indefinite and subject
to too many interpretations to enforce. Accordingly, the court found
that the defendants did not bind themselves in any fashion for pay-
ment of expenses unless there was recovery in their lawsuit. Since
there was no recovery, no expenses were owed to the plaintiff and,
of course, no attorney fee was granted. Judge Elmo Lear dissented
and was of the opinion that the trial court's decision in favor of the
clients was clearly wrong. He was of the opinion that the case had
been brought to a proper conclusion by the obtaining of the judg-
ment which had become executory and that, therefore, under the
language of the retainer agreement, the expenses and costs which
the attorney had advanced became due. Judge Lear did not believe
that the defendants could have reasonably expected the attorney to
advance and lose the expenses incurred if an actual monetary recovery
was not possible. From a practical standpoint, it would seem that
Judge Lear was correct, although every practicing attorney knows
that in situations of uncollectable judgments or lost law suits, the
chance of recovering expenses and costs is slim at best.
In the consolidated cases of Theus, Grisham, Davis & Leigh v.
Dedman and Coenen v. Dedman,37 two different law firms sued Mrs.
Dedman for legal services rendered to her in the course of contested
separation and divorce proceedings. The principle issues in these cases
were whether the records kept on a daily basis by the attorneys show-
ing time and expenses were objectionable as not the best evidence,
or were inadmissible as hearsay, or were both. The court concluded
that even though there might be cancelled checks and receipts to sup-
port the records of the attorneys, their existence did not make ap-
plicable the best evidence rule so as to exclude other evidence of the
expenditures, the other evidence being the detailed daily record of
each attorney. In addition, the court found that the records kept by
an attorney on a daily basis to aid in the evaluation and the account-
ing of his services to his clients in the ordinary course of the at-
torney's business are admissible under the business records excep-
tion to the hearsay rule, and recovery was allowed both law firms.
In Clark v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.,8 an attorney terminated in
37. 401 So. 2d 1231 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
38. 410 So. 2d 1187 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
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a worker's compensation matter filed a petition for intervention
wherein he sought to be dismissed as counsel of record and further
sought attorney's fees and costs according to his contract of employ-
ment and quantum meruit. A default judgment was obtained in this
facet of the case, from which the plaintiff appealed and filed a peremp-
tory exception, wherein he alleged that a succeeding attorney is an
indispensable party to any action by a terminated attorney to collect
a contingent fee and the failure to join the succeeding attorney
rendered the proceedings fatally defective, requiring remand. Rely-
ing on Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Products,39 the court agreed and found
that "a terminated attorney is obligated to name the succeeding at-
torney as an indispensable party in any action to recover attorney's
fees inasmuch as the issue of attorney fees was to be resolved by
allocation between the attorneys of the highest ethical contingent fee
to which client had agreed.""0 Accordingly, the judgment of the trial
court was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
Some of the factors in determining a reasonable fee were discuss-
ed in McKernan v. Watson,"' wherein the attorneys had originally
agreed to defend a person accused of armed robbery for the sum of
$5,000. After the attorneys had done considerable work, but before
trial, the accused discharged them and retained another attorney. He
paid nothing to his original attorneys, who then filed suit for the sum
of $2,500 alleging that the contract between the parties was for $5,000
but, because the plaintiffs did not handle the matter through trial,
they were demanding only half of the original fee. The court con-
sidered the amount of time spent on the case by the attorneys, the
seriousness of the charge, the diligence and skill of the representa-
tion afforded the defendant, and the degree of expertise involved in
the case and concluded that a fee of $2,500 on a quantum meruit basis
was reasonable.
Two cases, both decided by the first circuit, emphasized the limita-
tion on an attorney's ability to bind his client without clear and ex-
press consent. In General Electric Credit Corp. v. Coleman,42 it was
held that an attorney could not sign a binding settlement agreement
for and on behalf of his client without written authorization. In Baker
v. Purselley,4" the court held that a party's counsel did not have
authority to compromise his client's claim without the client's clear
and express consent. The same point was made by Judge Marvin in
Boyette v. Auger Timber Co., wherein he stated that an attorney could
39. 373 So. 2d 102 (La. 1979).
40. 410 So. 2d at 1188.
41. 407 So. 2d 434 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
42. 408 So. 2d 376 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
43. 411 So. 2d 553 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
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not ethically take a position contrary to the interest of his own client,
particularly where the client resisted the attorney's course of action."
During this term of court, not only have there been suits by clients
against attorneys and attorneys against clients, there have been also
suits by attorneys against attorneys. In both Wattigny v. Lambert'5
and Freeman v. Cooper," the plaintiff attorney accused the defendant
attorney of defamatory statements; the alleged statements were made
in a petition in the former case and in a brief in the latter. In Wat-
tigny, the court stated,"We have used all or part of the following pro-
visions of the Code of Professional Responsibility to aid in our deter-
mination of this difficult question. The provisions utilized are Ethical
Consideration 2-30; Disciplinary Rule 2-109; Ethical Consideration 7-4;
Ethical Consideration 7-10; Ethical Consideration 7-22; and Disciplinary
Rule 7-102. ' , 7 Ethical Considerations 7-37 and 7-38, as well as
Disciplinary Rule 7-106(C)(1)(5), might well have been added to the list.
These provisions of the code essentially provide that, in adversary pro-
ceedings, the clients are the litigants and there should be no ill feel-
ings between the attorneys, neither of whom should make any unfair,
derogatory, or personal reference concerning the other.
In Wattigny, the alleged defamatory statements directed toward
opposing counsel were characterized by the court as misstatements
of fact. They accused the attorney and others of committing certain
crimes, and the evidence clearly showed that those statements were
false. In Freeman, the defendant attorney accused the plaintiff attorney
of lying to the court in the prior litigation in which they were both
involved. In addition, in his brief, the defendant attorney accused op-
posing counsel and his client of acting "above and beyond the law"
and of "being outside of the law." Thus, the defendant attorney clear-
ly imported, according to the court, that the attorney and his client
acted in concert to place allegations before the court which they knew
to be untrue.
Both courts made it clear that in Louisiana only a qualified
privilege exists as protection for the attorney (and his client) in judicial
proceedings. In order for this qualified privilege to apply, the state-
ment must be material and must be made with probable cause and
without malice. The supreme court, in Freeman, went on to say:
One purpose of the privilege extended to attorneys for statements
made in judicial proceedings is to discourage actions against per-
sons who are merely performing their duties. Attorneys must be
44. 403 So. 2d at 805.
45. 408 So. 2d 1126 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
46. 414 So. 2d 355 (La. 1982).
47. 408 So. 2d at 1135.
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free to represent their clients without constant fear of actions based
on statement [sic] made in the zealous prosecution or defense
of an action. Nevertheless, the privilege granted to an attorney
is not a license to impugn the professional integrity of opposing
counsel or the reputation of a litigant or witness.48
In both cases, it was concluded that the attorney seeking damages
for defamation was not a public official nor a public figure, but a,
private individual who had relinquished no part of his interest in the
protection of his good name and his professional reputation.
48. 414 So. 2d at 359.

